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AN EVALUATION OF ITAMl'S
"ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR MODEL"
AS A MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING
FRAMEWORK USING BAIMAN'S CRITERIA
Simon C. Dzeng•
Introduction
During the pa~t two decack~. there have been many propo,ed managerial
accounting (1\1/\ hereafter) framcwod,, publi~hed in the literature. 1 he funJamental goal of the~e frame11 ork~ 11 a, to provide a convincing anJ cohe~ive theory which can explain and analyle ~ome. if 1101 mo~t, of the existing
1\IA practices. Baiman (19821 provided a quite ..:omprehensive review and
comparison of ,ome of the,e frameworb. He approadted the task by applying thi~ fundamental logic: "The u~e, of 1\1,\ in formation ,hould be a
deri1 able implication of the model rather than an a.,~umption of the moJcl. ''
(Baiman l19821, p. 158. emphasis added.) Thu~ he adopteJ the tc\t of the
u~efulne~s of any propo~cd model a, n hether its c.leri1 ed dt·nwnds for information include tho~t' !N!, of \IA informi.ltion that are obsen·ed. (p. 158)
Baiman identified three major u~e~ of 1\1.-\ information and subjected all
model, to an analysi~ using the,c three u,e~: belief re1i~ion u,i:, moti1ational use, and risk -,haring u,e. Hi, condu,ion "a~ that the agency model 11a~
the only model that is consi~tent with all of these three ob,erve<l uses. He
then 11cnt on to examine the consistency between agency model and several
moM commonly ob~erved 1\1,\ practices. The result~ were rhat the agency
model implications \\ere consistent \\ith four of the six practices. These t110
,ets of results are ~ummariLed in Table, I and 2. respectively, in this paper.
A ,omewhat different and non-traditional framewor~ for MA wa, introduced by ltami 11977) in hi, innovative monograph AdaptiH' Bch:nior:
'\lanaj!l'IIIC'lll Control and Informa tion Anal~,i,. He integrated mo~t management control and information analysis frature~ (or obsened practices rationale) into a very ~implc one-period, one or mo players. optimal
intra-period informarion (or dcci~ion) timing (he calkd this timing A) model,
rhe A-model. Comprehen~ive and inclusive a~ it is, however, the model ha~
not attracted much attention since the introduction. For this very rca\on.
a brief synopsi, of ltami's A-model is pr01ided in the Appendi.lC for those
,~ho are not familiar" ith it.
For \\hate\er rea,on, Baiman did not include the descn ing ltami's A-model
a, part of his rcvie\\ paper. The purpose of this study is to examine the a<lap·
tile beha\ior model, using Baiman', criteria. and to somewhat expand Baiman\ work. The analy~es showed that the A-model is consbtent with the
three-information-uses criteria, and it b also t·onsi~tent with the same four
out of six MA practices mentioned by Bai man that were consistent with the
*The author would like to thank Dr. C.A. Srinivasan and Dr. Rohit Jain,
both at Drexel University, ror their helpful comment s.
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Table I
S ubjecting Age ncy T heor} to MA Info Ui.e TPst

Belief Motivational RiskRevil,iOn
U l,C
Sharing

Models

Source

Decisio n Theory
Model

Felt ham [ I 968)

X

Syndicate Theory

Wilson ( 1968)

X

X

Info-evaluator / Deci- Dems ki/ Feltham
sion maker Model & (1977);
Bailey Boe I1976)
Mathemat ical
Program ming Model

X

Team Theory Model Marschak Radner

X

Demand Revelation
Model

Loeb (I 9751:
Gro\ es (1975]

X

X

NI N

Agency Model

Alchian Dent\Cll

X

X

X

( 1972)

(1 972);

assumed•

N1A"

Williamso n ct al.
(1975);

Jensen / Meckling
( 1976]

'Ilaiman argued that the motivational u~e of information wa, a.,,umed by
these authors. (See Baiman [1982). p. 160, and footnote Jon the same
page.)
~N/ A in this table indica1e5 that either the dc,ign of the models did 1101 address the ri\k-sharing i~sue or that Batman did 1101 discu5\ it at all.
Baiman argued that ,ince thi\ model is "more appropriate for analysing
worker cooperatives than capitali,t firms," (p. 160) it is inappropriate for
the MA di5cussion at hand.

agency model. Therefore, based on Baiman·, .:riteria al least, A-modrl is at
least as good as the much more popular agency modd.
In the next section, the A-model will be subjected to the test\ of the three
information uses suggested by Baiman. The next section contains another
test of the common M A practices comparison aho done by Baiman. Concluding rcmarb \\ill enc.I thh paper.

Examining the A- Model With ThrC'e Info lh e,
According to Bai man [ 1982], MA information has al least t hrec observed
uses:
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Table 2
Subjecting Agency Theory to MA Practkt•s Test

MA Practice

Rcpres(•ntalivc
Aut hor~

Major
Conclusion~

Responsibility Baiman / Demsl..i In evaluating and rewarding an agent
Accounting
[ 19801;
who controb only part of the firm's
Holmstrom
output, it may be optimal to evaluate
the agent on the ba~i., of the firm's
(1981 I
entire output. The lo.ey is that even
output~ O\er which the ,ubordinate
exercise~ no influence may contain
info that can he used hy the supervi,or lO improvi;: his as~es~ment of
the ~ubordinatc's action choice.
Budget,

Holm~trom
[1979)

Conditional
Variance
lmc~tigation
policies

The agency model is con,i~tcnt with the
u,t: of budget-ba~cd contracts.

Baiman1 De1ml,.i The u,c and form of the one-tail conditional variance invc~tigation Mt\ tool
i~ optimal within an agency context.

[ 1980)

Cost
Allocation*

Zimmerman
(1979]; Dcrml..i

Agc11-:y theory does not provide a convincing rationale for cost allocation~.

Participative
Budgeting

Baiman Ernm

A rationale \\ a~ provided for participa-

(1981 l
[1981]

Dem,ki /
Feltham (1978)

tive budgeting that i~ an alternative
to (hut not inc;on~i~tcnt with) the rationale provided by the behavioral
literature.

The ans\\er to the question "What doe\
the agency literature ~ugge~t concerning the correct choice of standards?"
is not yet clearly defined in the existing literature.

*According to Baiman [1982]. the,e two MA practices arc not comistent with
the agency theory, at lea~t based on the evidi:nce provided by the existing
literal ure.
(I) The belief revision use (Simo n [ 1954] call~ it prob/em-solving use) This use of MA information is to improve a manager's C.\ ante as~essmcnt
of the production environment in order to improve his production decisions.
(2) The motivational use - Thi~ use of MA information is to help supervisors motivate their s ubordinates.
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(3) The risk-shari11g usc - This use is to facilitate the allocation, among
members of the firm, of the risk inherent in operating in an uncertain production environment.
Since the last two uses arc interrelated, Baiman referred to them jointly
as the performance evaluatio11 use of MA information. Simon [ 19541 calls
this the scorekeeping use. See Bai man f 19821 for more discussions on these.

Belief-Revision Usr

Throughout chapters 3, 4, and 5 of ltami', monograph, he talked about
the "ex ante plan" which is the production plan the manager determint:, at
the beginning of the period. This e~ ante plan is one of the crucial element,
of Itami's model. The manager can come up with a plan like this only if
he has access to some previous periods' I\IA information. Thus the belief
revision use of MA information is directly derivable from the model', construction. Furthermore, the very core of the adaptive behavior modd - the
adaptive behavior cau~ed by ne,, information received by the manager at
point A - is the be, t representation of the concept of belief revi,ion!
Moth•ational U!>c
The title of chapter 4 of ltami'~ monograph i, "Budgetary Control and
Performance E\ aluat ion with lntraperiod Adaptive Behavior," ,, hich ,ay,
a lot about the strong moth ational implications of hi, model. ltami differentiate, between ex atllc and ex post 5tandard~ and ,tresses the moti\ational
aspects of hoth. The former motivates the wbordinate, by stating the performance level c\'pected of them given previou, performance and the forecasted environmental factor, (rnch a, macro1:conomic variable,). ( ltami callc<l
this the "forward-looking \tandard. ") The latter moti,alC!, !,Ubordinate, by
representing a performance le\ el which ~houhl h,-n c been achieved given the
appropriate adaptive beha,ior and the actual t'll\ iron mental conditions.
(!tam, called thi, the "backward-looking ,tand,ird.") Therefore, the adaptive behavior model is perfectly consistent with the motivational u~c of I\IA
informal ion.
Risk-SharinJ! ll!>e
According to ltarni, there arc I\\O problem, a,,ociatcd \\ith management
control under uncertainty: ri,k congruence and incorporation or adaptive
bcha\iOr into management l·ontrol system. Thc~e tWl) problem, form a
tradcoff depending on the "reversahility of n ante ~tandard." (ltami define, the reversability oft'\' ante , tandard a~ "ho,, m11d1 adju,tment, and
revisions arc possible after a <leci~ion is mack." (p. 22 of ltami [I 977))) A!,
ltami pu15 it, "when rever,ahility of an c.\ ante decision is ~mall, ri,t,,. congruence at the e,1. ame decision control pha,c become~ very important. When,
on the other hand, re\-Cr!,ability i, large, adaptive beha\ ior become, more
important." (p. 22) Alt hough he recognize, the importance of hot h problems.
he chose to concentrate on the adaptive behavior in hi, monograph, since
he had discussed the risk congruence issue in hi~ other two papers (ltami
[ 19751, I19761). Ikea use the crux of the risk congruence problem i, how much
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risk a control procedure or evaluation ,cheme force the subordinate to share
the uncertain outcomes. and also given the analysis above, the adaptive behavior model (the A-model) b obviou~ly not i/11.:on,istent with the risk sharing use of MA information.
In conclusion, ltami'~ adaptive bcha\ ior model is consistent with the belief rc~ision and the motivational u~c~ of !\1A information, but not inconsistent with the ri~k sharing use.

Con~btenc~ With MA Prattil'e,
llaiman u,ed ,ix !\1,\ practices ,imply becau,e of their common use. This
li,t is not supposed to be cxhau,tivc.
R<•spunsibilit~ Accounl ing
Respon,ibility accou1Hing ,tatcs that a per,on ,hould be evaluated only
on the basis of those factor, that he controb. Baiman found that agency
theory is in general con,istent ,\ith responsibility accounting excert for some
narro\\ interpretation difference,. ltami aJJre,\e, the issue of "controllable and uncontrollable" parameters in hi, A-model (p. 68, also refer to AppenJi\ of thb paper for definition, of the parameters). I k mentioned that
"when parameters exist in the A-model (c, A, b) who,e \alues may change
from pi::riod to period but whose \'ariation, arc considered controllable by
the ,ubordinate to a sub,tantial degree, \\C need to dbt1nguish bct\\cen uncontrollable and controllable parameter~." (p. 69) The ~pirit here is obviously consi~tent \\ith that of the re~ponsibility accounting. ltami c,cn went
one ~tep further to include a controllabk parameter variance (CPV) term
in hi, total I ariancc equation for \arian<.:c analysis, 1\ hich will be di5.;usscd
later.

Rudl!tl•Ha~cd Compensation Schedule
llaiman found that the agency model is comistent 11 ith the u,c of budgetba,cd payment ~chedulc (contract). In ltarni'~ model, the t'\ ante ~tandard
can be thought of a~ the normally defined budget. Since the ~ubordinate's
compensation is ba~ed on hi, performance evaluation, whkh is in turn a function of the \ariance analysb using both thee, ante and e1 post ~tandard~
(the former is nothing but the exrccted value of the latter), ltami's A-model
can be ~aid to be combtent with budget-ba,cd payment 5<.:hcdule. (See equation -1.2 and 4.3 on p. 61.)
Conditional Varianl:e Anahsi~
Bai man also found agen~y modd consi~tent "ith thi~ MA practice. Given
the thorough discu,sion and analy\is of thee, a111e and n post ~tandarJs
and variance analysis ba~ed on them, one can almost automatically conclude
that the A-model is con~istent with the common conditional varian..:c analy~b practice in MA. In fact, ltami's elaborate variance analysi~ is far more
complex and comprehensive than mo~t variance analy~is models ever heen
suggested. His most complete variance analysis equation
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(TV=AV+CPV+FEV+UV, sec equations 4.8 and 4.9 on p. 69) incorporates elements such as adaptation variance (AV), controllable parameter
variance (CPV), forecast error variance (FEVJ. and uncertainty variance (UV)
of the total variance (TV).

Participative Budgl'ting

Baiman also found agency model consistent with the participative budgeting practice. On thi~ iswe. ltami note, "participation is beneficial when it
succeeds in two influencing~ - goal influencing and consequence influencing. The s ubordinate'., personal goal may be influenced by participation
through the better chance of acceptance or internalilation of what is agreed
upon by the subordinate. The consequence factor in the mind of the ,ubordinate may he influenced by participation through making reward ~tructurc~
dearer to him." (p. 19) This. plu, the detailed discussions on the communication between the subordinate and the superior about the reasonable production plan and the forecasts of the cm-ironmcntal factors in chapters 3 through
5, we must say that ltami's ,l-modcl is con,i5tent with the participative budgeting practice.

Standards

Unfortunately, Baiman concluded that agency model's ability to ,uggest
the c.:orrcd choice of ,tandard, (poinb at which the nondifferentiability of
the budget- based payment ~chedule occ.:url is not yet \\ell explored. ltami'~
,l-model is al 5o weak in this respect. Although he ha, quite thorough discussions on the theoretical definitions and irnplicatiom of e, ;1111e and c>.\ rosr
5tandard,. the model dol'., not ,ccm to help manager, ,et the ortimal ~tandartl~ at an operational level.
Co~t Allocation

Although being able to ~uggcst a po,siblc rationale for thb common ~,IA
pra<.:ticc, 13aiman concluded that agency model', ability to explain thi~ practice i, 1101 yet clear. Since ltami did nllt mention thi., practice at all in hi,
monograph, we c.:an only speculate, ba,cd on hi, thesb. that ,l-model is not
abk to explain it either, at lca,t m1\\ and from the ,urface.
In conclusion, I tami's ,l-model is comi,tent with at ka,t four out of the
~ix 1VIA practice~ med by Bai man. J"'hc two that do not ,eem to be con, istent
11011 ma) well be ~hown 10 be l'On~i,tent in the future literature. Beside,,
ltami did mention another common MA practice of interim reporting which
can not only be e~plaincd \,ell by A-model, but al~o benefit from the model',
analysi, to determine the optimal timing of report~.
C onclu~ions

In this raper, I have used Baiman', 119821 criteria to examine ltami's [19771
adaptive behavior model (A-model) and found that the model's u,c, of MA
information arc consistent with the three info uses Bai man suggested: belief
revision, motivational. and ri~I- sharing. I also found that the ,l-mockl is con-
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sistent with four common MA practices suggested by Baiman and o ne mentioned by ltami himself: responsibility accounting, budget-based payment
schedule, variance analysis, participative budgeting, and interim reporting.
Two MA practices were not well explained by ltami'~ model: cost a llocation
and standard setting. O\crall, howe\'cr, A-model did very well as fa r as Baiman's criteria ,et i, concerned. Agency model \\a, the only one of the seven
reviewed by Baiman that met all three u,e, test. It is al,o consistent with
four out of six MA practices. From this point of v iew, the A-model fares
at least a s well as the agency model a, a managerial accounting framework.
The question then arises: why didn't A-model gain a, much popularity and
attention a~ agency model did since the 70'~? The amwer to this question
may have to await future rcscan:h. One po,~ibk approach is to compare the
A-modd and the agency model directly against each <it her. This comparison,
pre,umably focusing o n the different a,sumption set\ and linear programming mode l parameter~. ,hould ,hed , ome light o n this question. For example, the A-model , eerm to have a much more detailed and specific as~umption
set about the information flow, and intraperiod adaptive behav ior than the
agency model does . If thi, \\ere the case, it would certainly nrnlo.e it much
more di ffirnlt to model and analy1e, especiall y when we try to apply it to
the real world. It is also obviou, that the A-model has a lot more stochastic
parameter~ modelled in the linear programming form compared to the agency
model. thu~ dramatically increasing the complexity of the problem-solving
and analysis processe~. Nevertheless, given the strong theo retical and practical implications of the A-model that we found in this study, it appear~ worthy for i\lA researchers to explore the mu,:h neglected implicatiom of the
J.-model.
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Appendix: S) nopsis of ltami':, AdaptiH· Bcha,ior Model, the A- Model
The easie~1 way to understand 1he A-model probably is to first take a look
at 1he following time line:

all info
)\

tz"·~~
no info
I. Sometime between the beginning and 1hc end (i.e., 0 and I) of 1he

period, 1he manager (lhe per\on who is relegated the responsibility
for 1he whole operation) can acquire pertecc information on 1he
,alue of ae1ual demand for 1he entire period (~) denotes thb information point and o.;;A.;; I. Before A, there i~ no additional information on demand other than what the manager already had at the
beginning of the period (i.e., 1he probability dimibu1ion of<): and
after .l, 1herc i~ no uncertainty lcf1.
2. From lime O until lime .I. (called the prcinformation .rnbperiod), the
operation is carried out according to "'hate, er production plan the
manager had determined for che entire period at the beginning (ltami calh 1 hi5 plan an C\ anee plan and denote it by ,;) at a uniform
rate ,,i1h rc~pect to time. Thus, by time .I.. the firm ,,ill ha,e
produced h unit~ of 1he product.
3. From time A until lime I (called the rostinformacion subperiod). tht
operation is carried ou1 at a ne,, production ra1c whil:h b determined to maximize the net profit for the noYt-known value of the
actual demand for lhe period, given the fact that ii has already
produced .l.x. Denoting the amount of production in this 5ubperiod
by z, the total production for 1he entin: period is Ax + z.
4. For production during the postinformation subperiod, a capacity
constraint exists proportional to the length of this subperiod, that is
o,;;L,;;(1-A)d. (di~ the overall capacity).
5. It i.'> assumed that there is no changeover co~t due to a change in
the production rate for the postinformation ~ubperiod (i.e., a
change from ( I - .l)x to z).
This adaptive behavior model can also be presented in the form of a linear
programming form with two separate stages: the first depicts the overall periodic planning model, called (G); while the second de.'>cribes the postinforma1ion subperiod optimization model, called (G2).
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(G )

max ex -

x, y+ ,y -

PY • -

s.t. Ax + y+ -yBx~ d
x,y+ ,y- ,:l- 0

qy
b

Considering a firm producing m products using n activities under k capacity constraints. x is a vector of activity levels and Ax is a vector of the
amounts of m producb, where A represents a matrix of technological production coefficients of each activity. b is a vector of market demands for m
products. y+ and y - arc vectors of shortage and surplus for each product.
Capad1y utilization is a~sumed to be linear in terms of activities and represented by Bx , where B is a matrix of capacity utilization coefficients for each
activity and capacity. d represents the limits of capacity utiliLation for the
entire period. c is a vector of ne1 profit for each activity per unit operation
and p and q are V<~clors of linear penalty for shortage and ~urplus respectively.
Thus, for any ex ante plan x and actual parameter values now kno\\n at
lime A, the decision for 1he postinforma1ion subperiod can be determined
by 1he following ~econd-stage linear programming model, called (G2):
(G2)

max c(~)z - py+ - qyz,y-> ,ys.t. A(~)z + y+ - y 81
( I - A)d
z,y+ ,y- ,:l- 0

where z (n x I vector) is 1he ~econd-stage dccbion , ariable (or postinformation equivalent of x).
Besides lhese basic models, lcami also prm ided numerou~ numerical examples and extensions of 1he model in hi, monograph . lnteres1cd reader,
are encouraged to refer to 1hc original monograph.
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